A continuing resolution freezes Pentagon funding at the prior year's levels and legally bars "new starts" — new programs, accelerated production lines, new multiyear contracts — until Congress enacts full-year appropriations. The fiscal 2026 stopgap, running under Section 102 of the Continuing Appropriations and Extensions and Other Matters Act, 2026, is the latest turn of a pattern that has become normal rather than exceptional: the Department of Defense has operated under a continuing resolution in all but 12 of the last 49 fiscal years, according to a Government Accountability Office review reissued February 4, 2026.
That prevalence matters because a CR is not a smaller budget — it is the same dollar figure moving through a narrower set of rules. Programs cannot grow, start, or restructure. Contracting officers cannot sign the multiyear deals that lower unit costs. The result, GAO found after surveying 74 acquisition programs, is not abstract: about 49 percent reported schedule delays, and the costs of working around the freeze land on facilities contracts, vehicle programs, and training exercises months after the shutdown threat that triggered the CR has faded from the news.
What Does a Continuing Resolution Actually Prohibit?
A CR prohibits new starts and accelerated activity, full stop — that is its defining legal mechanism, not a side effect. Section 102 of the FY2026 act bars the Defense Department from obligating stopgap funds for "new or accelerated production" of projects, for "other new starts and activities," and for initiating new multiyear procurements, per the Senate Appropriations Committee's section-by-section summary of the act.
Congress can still carve out exceptions inside that freeze, and the FY2026 text does: it authorizes up to $154 million to keep the Virginia-class submarine program moving and up to $200 million for the E-7 Wedgetail airborne early-warning aircraft, both name-checked in the same section-by-section document. Those carve-outs are the exception that proves the rule — every other program not explicitly listed stays locked at last year's funding profile, with last year's scope, until a full appropriations bill replaces the CR.
How Much Do the Delays Actually Cost?
The costs are line-item and traceable, not speculative. GAO's review found a facilities-sustainment contract at Joint Base San Antonio rose from an initial estimate of $579,000 to $1,445,000 after CR-related delays pushed the award into a period of currency and market shifts. The Marine Corps' Amphibious Combat Vehicle program absorbed an additional $17.7 million across fiscal years 2022 through 2024 tied to the same kind of delay-driven timing exposure.
The pattern extends to how money gets spent once it is finally available. In fiscal years with short CRs, research and development accounts had obligated roughly 41 percent of their total funding by the end of the second quarter; in years with long CRs, that figure fell to about 31 percent, per the GAO report. Spending does not disappear — it compresses into the back half of the fiscal year, which is itself a worse way to buy weapons systems and services than a steady pace would be.
Administrative overhead is the least visible cost and, by GAO's account, one of the largest in staff time. F-35 program officials told auditors that roughly 20 percent of their financial-management staff's time goes toward replanning budgets to fit CR constraints — work that produces no additional capability, only compliance with the freeze.
Is the Damage Overstated? The Counterargument, Answered
The strongest case for continuing resolutions is that they are the alternative to something worse. A CR keeps the government funded, avoids a shutdown, and — as the FY2026 act's own drafters note — is written to "protect employee compensation" so uniformed and civilian personnel keep being paid while Congress finishes its work. Lawmakers can and do carve out named exceptions, as the submarine and Wedgetail funding shows, meaning the mechanism has some flexibility built in rather than being a blunt, universal freeze.
That argument holds for payroll and shutdown avoidance, which is exactly what CRs are designed to protect. It does not hold for acquisition and training, where GAO's own data shows the freeze has a cost that shutdown-avoidance framing does not capture: canceled training events tied to funding gaps, delayed contract awards on nearly half of surveyed programs, and a spending curve pushed toward the end of the fiscal year regardless of how carefully the CR is written. Protecting paychecks and protecting program timelines are separate problems, and the FY2026 act solves only the first one by default.
What Does This Change?
The recurrence is the story more than any single CR is. With the Pentagon under stopgap funding in 37 of the last 49 fiscal years — and long CRs, those exceeding three months, in eight of the last 15 — the "temporary" measure functions as a standing operating condition for defense budgeting rather than an occasional interruption. A 2021 Breaking Defense analysis of Army modernization programs under a prior CR illustrates why that recurrence compounds: new-start prohibitions delayed funding for programs including a $287 million Mobile Protected Firepower effort and $108 million in B-21 Raider advance procurement, pushing schedules that, once slipped, are difficult to recover.
What the evidence points to is a defense budget process where the announced top-line number and the money actually available to move programs forward are two different things for months at a stretch. Congress's own appropriators can narrow that gap with named carve-outs, as they did for the submarine and Wedgetail lines in FY2026. Absent those carve-outs, GAO's data indicates the compliance and delay costs of a CR are not shutdown-adjacent — they show up in program schedules, industrial-base planning, and financial-management staff time long after the immediate funding lapse has been avoided.
FAQ
How long can a continuing resolution last?
There is no fixed limit; duration is set by whatever Congress passes. GAO found that in eight of the last 15 fiscal years, the Pentagon operated under CRs exceeding three months, and the FY2026 stopgap itself was written to run until a full-year defense appropriations act is enacted.
What exactly counts as a "new start" that a CR blocks?
Under Section 102 of the FY2026 act, it covers new or accelerated production, other new starts and activities, and the initiation of new multiyear procurement contracts — programs that were not already funded and underway in the prior fiscal year.
Can specific programs be exempted from a CR's restrictions?
Yes, when Congress names them. The FY2026 continuing resolution explicitly authorizes up to $154 million to continue Virginia-class submarine work and up to $200 million for the E-7 Wedgetail program, exceptions carved directly into the bill text rather than left to agency discretion.
For a related policy perspective, read How a Federal Government Shutdown Actually Works.
For more context, read How a Pentagon Program Moves From Requirement to Fielding.
For more context, read How U.S. Navy Ships Get Their Names.